Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems

Tony Tie Luo; Salil S. Kanhere; Jianwe Huang; Sajal K. Das; Fan Wu

doi:10.1109/MCOM.2017.1600746CM

Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems

Tony Tie Luo
, Salil S. Kanhere
, Jianwe Huang
, Sajal K. Das
, Fan Wu

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market- driven mechanisms.

Original language	American English
Journal	IEEE Communications Magazine
Volume	55
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2017.1600746CM
State	Published - Mar 1 2017

Keywords

Commerce
Game theory
Bargaining game
Contract Theory
Design Principles
Incentive mechanism
Market driven
Sustainability issues
Trust and reputation systems
Distributed computer systems

Disciplines

Computer Sciences

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10.1109/MCOM.2017.1600746CMLicense: CC BY

https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2017.1600746CM

Cite this

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title = "Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems",

abstract = " Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market- driven mechanisms.",

keywords = "Commerce, Game theory, Bargaining game, Contract Theory, Design Principles, Incentive mechanism, Market driven, Sustainability issues, Trust and reputation systems, Distributed computer systems",

author = "Luo, \{Tony Tie\} and Kanhere, \{Salil S.\} and Jianwe Huang and Das, \{Sajal K.\} and Fan Wu",

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doi = "10.1109/MCOM.2017.1600746CM",

language = "American English",

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AU - Luo, Tony Tie

AU - Kanhere, Salil S.

AU - Huang, Jianwe

AU - Das, Sajal K.

AU - Wu, Fan

PY - 2017/3/1

Y1 - 2017/3/1

N2 - Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market- driven mechanisms.

AB - Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market- driven mechanisms.

KW - Commerce

KW - Game theory

KW - Bargaining game

KW - Contract Theory

KW - Design Principles

KW - Incentive mechanism

KW - Market driven

KW - Sustainability issues

KW - Trust and reputation systems

KW - Distributed computer systems

UR - https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/comsci_facwork/775

UR - https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2017.1600746CM

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DO - 10.1109/MCOM.2017.1600746CM

M3 - Article

VL - 55

JO - IEEE Communications Magazine

JF - IEEE Communications Magazine

ER -

Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems

Abstract

Keywords

Disciplines

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