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Does It Pay to Disclose Managerial Earnings Information Early?

  • Gregory M. Gelles
  • , John S. Howe
  • , Xuejing Xing

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Does it pay to voluntarily disclose the manager's private information about the firm's earnings prospects before the mandatory announcement date? This question has been a subject of much debate because prior research establishes both benefits and costs of early information disclosure. We provide evidence on the net effect of such disclosure by examining its impact on firm value. Using a large sample and correcting for self-selection bias, we find that early disclosure of the manager's private earnings information enhances the end-of-period value of the firm.

Original languageAmerican English
JournalJournal of Financial Research
Volume34
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2011

Keywords

  • Disclosure
  • Earnings forecasts
  • Voluntary disclosure

Disciplines

  • Economics

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